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The Shareholder Base and Payout Policy
Andriy Bodnaruk and Per Östberg∗
Abstract
We examine the relation between the shareholder base and payout policy. Consistent with
the idea that the shareholder base is related to the cost of external financing, we find that
firms with small shareholder bases have lower payout levels and maintain higher cash
holdings. We show that undertaking an open market repurchase results in a significant
reduction in the size of the shareholder base. Consequently, we find that firms with small
shareholder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the shareholder base
even further) and are more likely to pay special dividends.
I. Introduction
Finance practitioners acknowledge that having a broad shareholder base is
an important factor for many corporate decisions. For example, in a recent study
of firm payout policy, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely ((2005), p. 523)
survey financial executives and conclude, “With respect to payout policy, the
rules of the game include . . . [to] have a broad and diverse investor base.” In
practice, the acquisition and management of the shareholder base is the task of
the investor relations department or an investor relations firm.1 Wolfe Axelrod
Weinberger Associates LLC, an investor relations firm, states in its company
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profile, “Our efforts culminate in a broader shareholder base, increased liquid-
ity, a lower future cost of capital, and a better valuation relative to the client’s
peer group.”2
Despite the apparent importance of the shareholder base, there is little
academic evidence documenting the impact of the shareholder base on corpo-
rate decisions. In this paper we investigate the effect of the shareholder base on
the level and method of payout. There are several arguments that imply that ex-
ternal financing is costly for firms with small shareholder bases, either due to
asymmetric information or lack of visibility. First, the investor base may proxy
for the amount of external financing that is available. Merton (1987) argues that
the shareholder base measures the recognition of the firm. He develops an incom-
plete risk sharing model where the size of the firm’s investor base is negatively
related to the required return on the firm and hence its cost of capital.3 In this
setting, a small shareholder base implies that a limited fraction of the market is
informed about the stock, and hence the firm has a limited number of investors
from whom to raise capital. Merton argues that the shareholder base can be ex-
panded (allowing more funds to be raised), but at an increasing cost.4
Second, having a large number of shareholders may reduce asymmetric in-
formation between insiders and outsiders through more information production.
The intuition behind this argument is captured in the model of Holmstro¨m and
Tirole (1993). In their model, an increase in liquidity trading (the investor base)
leads to an increase in stock price informativeness through more information
acquisition by speculators. Additionally, empirically it has been documented that
analysts tend to follow firms that have more investors.5,6 So a large investor base
leads to greater analyst coverage and more information production overall, which
ultimately implies less asymmetric information about the firm.
Both of the above arguments imply that external financing is costly for firms
with small shareholder bases. Effectively, for firms with limited shareholder bases
there is a wedge between the internal and external costs of funds.7
We develop and test 3 hypotheses concerning the relation between the share-
holder base and payout policy using a sample of firms on NYSE, NASDAQ, and
AMEX between 1984 and 2004. First, a negative relation between the cost of
external financing and the shareholder base implies that we expect firms with
small shareholder bases to maintain higher cash reserves and pay out less to their
2See http://www.wolfeaxelrod.com/profile.htm
3There is a growing literature that documents a relationship between investor recognition and the
value of the firm. Kadlec and McConnell (1994), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and King and Segal
(2009) consider the effect of listing decisions on the shareholder base and their implications for firm
valuation. Additionally, Lehavy and Sloan (2008), Bodnaruk and ¨Ostberg (2009), and Fang and Peress
(2009) document that there is a cross-sectional relationship between investor recognition and returns
and therefore the cost of capital.
4Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that firms that have higher advertising expenditure also
have a larger number of shareholders, implying that the shareholder base can be expanded at a cost.
5See Bhushan and O’Brien (1990).
6Additionally, Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1993), Dimson and Marsh (1984), and
Womack (1996) document that analyst forecasts are informative.
7Kaplan and Zingales (1997) define a financial constraint as a wedge between the internal and
external costs of capital.
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shareholders. We find that small shareholder base firms have lower payout levels
and larger cash reserves. Firms at the 25th percentile of the shareholder base hold
between 4.75% and 6.38% more in cash reserves and pay out between 12.32%
and 23.37% less of their total assets (all relative to the unconditional mean) than
firms at the 75th percentile. We corroborate the above results on payout and cash
holdings in an experimental setting by considering the introduction of decimal
quotes on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX in 2001. Decimalization significantly
lowered trading costs and thereby raised the demand for shares by retail investors
and resulted in larger shareholder bases. This increase in the shareholder base is
associated with increased payout and decreased cash holdings.
Second, given that there is a relation between the shareholder base and the
cost of external financing, this has a potential implication for the method of pay-
out. A firm considering making a special distribution can do it either in the form
of a share repurchase or through a special dividend. However, an open market
repurchase program may result in a smaller shareholder base if some sharehold-
ers tender all of their shares. We verify this conjecture by demonstrating that a
share repurchase program reduces the shareholder base of the firm by at least
3.70% over the year of repurchase and the subsequent year. In contrast, non-
repurchasing firms experience, on average, a 3.69% increase in the shareholder
base over a 2-year period. Additionally, we find that special dividends either have
a neutral or even a positive effect on the shareholder base. Hence, we argue that
while repurchases are more tax efficient, they come at a cost of reduction in the
shareholder base and therefore higher costs of external financing.
Third, given that a repurchase reduces the size of the shareholder base, we
examine whether firms with already limited shareholder bases are less likely to
use a repurchase as a payout method and thereby reduce the size of the share-
holder base even further. We find that the shareholder base significantly affects
the decision to undertake one-time distributions to shareholders and the method of
distribution (special dividend or share repurchase). Small shareholder base com-
panies are more likely to pay special dividends. Conditional on undertaking a spe-
cial distribution, companies with small shareholder bases choose to use a special
dividend (rather than repurchase stock) in 9.05% of cases, while 6.49% of special
distributions of large shareholder base firms are special dividends.
This paper is most closely related to the literature on investor recognition
and investor relations. This literature (see footnote 3) documents the effect of
the shareholder base on firm value and returns. The finding that the size of the
shareholder base is negatively related to returns implies that small shareholder
base firms have high costs of financing. We contribute to this literature by showing
that the shareholder base is also related to payout policy.
A number of papers consider the effect of investor composition on payout
policy. For example, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) examine the relation be-
tween institutional holdings and payout policy. Among other things, they find
that institutions prefer dividend-paying to nondividend-paying firms and firms
that repurchase shares. Instead of considering the composition of the firm’s in-
vestor base, we examine the size of the shareholder base. In fact, our measure
of the shareholder base is weakly negatively related to the degree of institutional
holdings (the correlation is −8.8%), which makes intuitive sense if institutional
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investors hold larger positions. Nonetheless, we control for institutional holdings
in our estimations, and this does not affect our results qualitatively. Addition-
ally, in a robustness section, we demonstrate that our results are independent of
investor composition. In essence, the clientele literature considers stock demand
by certain investor groups and relates that to payout policy, whereas we consider
the relation between total investor demand and payout policy.
Our paper is related to the extensive literature on the level and method of
payout. One of the central and most cited determinants of the level of payout is
agency costs (Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986)). Early work by Rozeff (1982)
uses the shareholder base as a proxy for the degree to which the firm is exposed
to agency costs. In Rozeff’s setting, a firm that has a large shareholder base is
also more exposed to agency problems and therefore pays out more as dividends.
Rozeff documents a positive correlation between the shareholder base and div-
idend payout, which is what we find (except that we consider Total Payout).
Although the size of the shareholder base may be related to the agency costs of
the firm, studies that examine the effect of exogenous increases in the shareholder
base (Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999), Sec. IV.C) document that increases in
the shareholder base are also associated with price increases.8 If the shareholder
base only is a proxy for agency costs, then we would expect a price decrease fol-
lowing an exogenous increase in the shareholder base as the agency problem has
been aggravated. In our regressions we include a host of control variables that
capture agency costs.
Another strand of literature relates financial constraints to the level of payout
(e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and Whited and Wu (2006)).
This literature uses a set of variables (including whether a firm has a positive
dividend payout) to construct measures of the cost of external financing. In con-
trast, this paper provides evidence that the shareholder base influences the cost of
external financing and therefore is related to payout and cash holdings of firms.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature that examines the determinants
of the method of payout.9 To our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate that
a repurchase adversely affects the shareholder base and that this adverse impact
is a possible explanation for why firms pay dividends even though repurchases
are more tax efficient. Other potential reasons for undertaking a repurchase rather
than a dividend include trading gains by insiders (Barclay and Smith (1988)),
improved stock liquidity (Barclay and Smith), flexibility (Stephens and Weisbach
(1998)), and maintaining the earnings per share (EPS) in the presence of stock
option exercise (Kahle (2002)).10
8See footnote 3.
9Black (1976) coined the term “dividend puzzle,” which refers to the fact that dividends represent
a substantial proportion of total payout even though repurchases are more tax efficient. To explain this
puzzle there has to be some drawback to using a repurchase as a payout method instead of dividends.
As we have shown, one difference between repurchases and dividends is that a repurchase reduces the
shareholder base while a dividend does not. Therefore, a possible explanation to the dividend puzzle
is that firms are reluctant to reduce their shareholder base.
10It is noteworthy that the improved liquidity, flexibility, and EPS motives for undertaking a repur-
chase cannot explain the extensive use of dividends, since they all present advantages of repurchases
over dividends.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present
testable hypotheses, and we describe our data in Section III. In Section IV, we
present empirical findings. We consider the robustness of our results in Section V,
and in Section VI we conclude.
II. Testable Hypotheses
Our testable hypotheses come from the tenet that there is a negative relation
between the size of the shareholder base and the cost of external financing. For
example, the model of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993) can be used to justify why
price informativeness is related to the size of the shareholder base.11 If a larger
shareholder base implies more liquidity traders, then this creates incentives for
speculators to acquire more information. This in turn leads to lower asymmetric
information and therefore to a lower cost of external financing. Since the share-
holder base is related to price informativeness, the wedge between the cost of
internal and external funds is decreasing in the size of the shareholder base.
Merton (1987) argues that a good measure of the recognition of a firm is
the size of its shareholder base. Likewise, the recognition of a firm is related to
the availability of external financing. So a firm with a large shareholder base is
widely recognized and therefore has a large pool of investors from whom to raise
financing. Merton argues that increasing the shareholder base may be possible,
but at a cost that is increasing. Therefore, it is costly for a firm with a limited
shareholder base to raise external financing, since this requires a costly increase
in the shareholder base (the firm requires more recognition).
The above arguments imply that the wedge between the cost of internal
and external financing is negatively related to the size of the shareholder base.
Therefore, we expect firms with small shareholder bases to rely more on internal
financing. As a result, these firms are expected to pay out less to their shareholders
and maintain higher cash reserves. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 1. Firms with small shareholder bases pay out less and hold larger
cash reserves.
Since the shareholder base and the cost of external financing are negatively
related, a reduction in the shareholder base will make external financing even
more expensive, which leads to a lower firm value. Indeed, Brav et al. ((2005),
p. 515) report, “Many firms feel that their stock price would fall if they had a less
diverse investor base.”
The method of payout may have implications for the size of the shareholder
base. For example, when a firm undertakes a repurchase, there are two counter-
vailing effects on the size of the shareholder base. On the one hand, the firm
generates attention by announcing a repurchase, but on the other hand, if a sub-
stantial proportion of shareholders tender their entire stake, then the shareholder
11Harris ((2003), p. 238) writes: “Informed trading is most profitable in markets with many unin-
formed traders. In such markets, many informed traders compete to acquire information and act on it.
These markets therefore have very informative prices.”
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base will fall as a result of a repurchase. We anticipate the 2nd effect to dominate.
Hence our 2nd hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Share repurchases reduce the size of the shareholder base.
If a repurchase results in a smaller shareholder base, we expect that firms
will try to avoid undertaking a repurchase if the shareholder base is already lim-
ited (and external financing is expensive). In contrast, a special dividend has
no adverse impact on the shareholder base. This leads to the following testable
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Firms with small shareholder bases are more likely to pay a special
dividend and less likely to undertake a repurchase.
III. Sample and Variable Construction
A. Data
Our sample includes firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Data on
returns, prices, repurchases, and shares outstanding of stocks are obtained from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)-Compustat Merged Indus-
trial Database (CCM). We only consider firms with CRSP share codes 10 or 11.
Therefore, we exclude American depositary receipts, closed-end funds, real es-
tate investment trusts, and shares of firms incorporated outside the United States.
Our main variable of interest is the number of common shareholders of record
(Shareholder Base, CCM data 100), hence we exclude firms for which this vari-
able is missing.
We consider the period from 1984 to 2004. The choice of this period is
motivated by the introduction of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Rule 10b-18 in 1982, which provides a legal safe harbor for companies repur-
chasing their shares, greatly reducing the ambiguity associated with this activity.
Furthermore, since 1984, firms have been required to report the value of their re-
purchases in their cash flow statements, and this item can be found in the CCM
database as data item 115.
Our dependent variables are measures of firm cash holdings and payout. We
follow Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and define Cash as the
ratio of cash to total assets net of cash. Total Payout is defined as the sum of
total dividends and repurchases over total assets. We construct our measure of
repurchases using the CCM data item Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock
(item 115), which reports the amount of money a company spends on repurchas-
ing its own securities.12,13 To construct our variable Fraction Repurchased, we di-
vide the dollar value of shares repurchased by market capitalization. We further
12As a robustness test, we remove repurchases of preferred stock from our measure of repurchases
(like in Dittmar (2000) and Weisbenner (2004)). The results are not affected.
13Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) compare the accuracy of different sources of repurchase data and
conclude that Compustat purchases of common stock is the most accurate.
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screen stock repurchases by setting repurchases equal to 0 for any firm that does
not repurchase at least 1% of its market value of equity (as in Dittmar (2000)).
We draw from DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) in identifying spe-
cial dividends. We classify a cash distribution as a special dividend if it carries
distribution code of 1262 or 1272. These codes are used by CRSP if dividends
are labeled year-end, final, extra, or special. We do not include “interim” div-
idends (code 1282), since they are relatively uncommon in our sample period.
We also exclude dividends with distribution code 1292, defined as “nonrecurring,
or proceeds from sale of rights,” because they generally are not pure cash payouts
to stockholders. We set a special dividend dummy (Special Dividend) to 1 if a
company has paid a special dividend in a particular year, and 0 otherwise.
In selecting our sample, we omit firms with missing or negative values of
Market Capitalization and Book-to-Market (BM). We winsorize all of our vari-
ables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We also remove companies with values of
Cash above 0.8. This leaves us with 52,679 firm-year observations, which are the
basis for our analysis.14
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our data. In our sample, firm cash
holdings (Cash) are on average 14.62% of total assets. This is in line with Opler
et al. (1999). The average total payout (Total Payout) in our sample is 2.40% of
total assets. The average firm in our sample has 17,150 shareholders of record
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Data
In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics on the variables used in our study. The shareholder base is given in 1,000s.
All variables are described in the Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of the distribution.
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev.
Shareholder base 52,679 17.15 1.83 454.88
Market cap (mln) 52,679 1,898.18 180.78 10,646.16
Book-to-market (BM) 52,679 0.68 0.55 0.58
Price-to-earnings (PE) 52,679 15.88 13.72 43.99
Debt-to-equity (DE) 52,679 0.76 0.34 1.46
Operating income 52,679 0.12 0.13 0.14
R&D 52,679 0.04 0.00 0.27
Cash 52,679 0.14 0.06 0.17
Dividend payout 52,679 0.01 0.00 0.02
Total payout 52,679 0.02 0.01 0.04
Stock liquidity 52,679 1.15 0.74 1.30
Past year return 52,679 0.16 0.15 0.53
Volatility (×100) 52,679 0.68 0.39 1.15
Capital expenditures (Capex) 52,679 0.07 0.05 0.07
Firm age 52,679 22.40 18.00 18.03
ROE 52,679 0.05 0.11 0.40
Institutional ownership 52,679 0.38 0.35 0.25
Industry concentration 52,679 0.08 0.05 0.09
Misvaluation (RRV) 38,492 −0.04 −0.04 0.37
Whited-Wu index 38,492 −0.19 −0.19 0.14
Managerial ownership 5,876 0.01 0.00 0.03
Option-based compensation (OBC) 5,876 0.38 0.37 0.25
Board independence 5,876 0.63 0.67 0.18
Board size 5,876 1.28 1.26 0.30
Corporate governance index 5,876 9.28 9.00 2.66
Share repurchase dummy (×100) 52,679 22.66 0.00 41.87
Special dividend dummy (×100) 52,679 1.71 0.00 12.97
14As a robustness test, we removed all financial and regulated firms from our sample without
affecting our results qualitatively.
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(Shareholder Base). However, the median firm has only 1,830 shareholders. To
correct for skewness, we use the logarithm of Shareholder Base. Additionally,
a repurchase is undertaken in 22.66% of all firm years. A special dividend is
undertaken in 1.71% of all firm years. In unreported analysis we document a
declining trend in the frequency of special dividends. DeAngelo et al. (2000) con-
clude that this is because firms that undertake special dividends frequently relabel
these as regular dividends. However, like DeAngelo et al., we also find that the
frequency of “large” specials does not decrease over our sample period.
There are a number of alternative stories that we need to control for. First,
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) document that institutions avoid firms that do not
pay dividends. However, among dividend payers they prefer firms that pay lower
dividends. Institutions also prefer repurchasers and those firms that repurchase
regularly. To that end, we include among our control variables the fraction of out-
standing equity held by institutions (Institutional Ownership), which we calculate
from 13F filings that are included in the CDA/Spectrum database.
Second, several papers document that undervaluation is an important motive
for undertaking a repurchase (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995),
(2000)). It could well be that firms with large shareholder bases are undervalued
and therefore repurchase more often. We control for the undervaluation motive
by including the book-to-market ratio, the stock performance during the previous
year, and the Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (RRV) (2007) measure
of misvaluation in our estimations.
Third, since we argue that a small shareholder base creates a wedge between
the costs of internal and external funds, our paper is related to the literature on
financial constraints. To control for traditional measures of financial constraints,
we include the Whited and Wu (2006) index (Whited-Wu) in our regressions.15
Fourth, Barclay and Smith (1988) argue that one reason to avoid undertaking
a repurchase is that this may harm stock liquidity. They find that the bid-ask spread
widens around repurchase announcements.16 Using detailed buyback data from
Hong Kong, Brockman and Chung (2001) find that the bid-ask spread widens
and the depth narrows during repurchase periods. However, they also find that
the spread and the depth return to benchmark levels once managers disclose that
they are the source of the trading.17,18 Nevertheless, we control for liquidity by
considering the volume of shares traded over the past year divided by the number
of shares outstanding (Stock Liquidity).
Fifth, a large shareholder base may indicate that ownership is dispersed and
therefore firms with large shareholder bases might be more exposed to agency
problems. If large shareholder base firms are more exposed to agency problems,
15In unreported results, we have also included the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index in our estima-
tions without affecting our results qualitatively.
16Miller and McConnell (1995) find no evidence of a widening in bid-ask spread when considering
a different sample and methodology.
17Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) find that firms that are actively repurchasing are less sensitive to
market movements in a bearish market.
18In a study of U.S. repurchases, Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) find that liquidity increases
after a repurchase, and they attribute this result to the difference in the disclosure environment between
Hong Kong and the United States.
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we would expect them to pay out less to investors. To control for differences
in agency costs across firms, we consider the fraction of shares owned by the
top 5 company executives (Managerial Ownership). Additionally, we control for
differences in incentives provided to executives by including the proportion of
total compensation to the management of the firm paid in the form of stock
options (Option-Based Compensation). Including this variable in our analysis
also ensures that our results are not driven by repurchases that are undertaken
to offset stock grants and option exercises by firm managers. These measures are
calculated from the Thompson/Reuters Insider Database. A number of studies
examine the relation between firm governance and cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008)). We therefore in-
clude the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index (G) as a control
variable. We also include Board Size and Board Independence as controls. The
board controls as well as the Gompers et al. index are obtained from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).
Last, Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) document that one motive for
undertaking a repurchase is to alter the firm’s capital structure. To that end, we
include the Debt-to-Equity (DE) ratio when determining the factors that influence
the decision of undertaking a repurchase or paying a special dividend.
We provide a detailed description of the variables in the Appendix.
B. Excess Shareholder Base
Grullon et al. (2004) note that there is a strong relation between the Number
of Common Shareholders and variables such as Market Capitalization and Age.
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by other firm characteristics that
are not directly related to the recognition of the firm, we remove the effect of a
number of variables on the Number of Common Shareholders. In all subsequent
analysis we use the residuals from this regression, which we call Excess Share-
holder Base (ExShBase), as our measure of the shareholder base.19 In a different
context, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2009) estimate a similar regression and use the
residuals as a measure of firm visibility.
Table 2 presents our regression results. For each of the 22 years in our
sample, we estimate a cross-sectional regression where the dependent variable
is the logarithm of the Number of Common Shareholders, and then we report the
average of all the estimates. We follow Grullon et al. (2004) and include Age,
Return on Equity, Market Capitalization, 1/Share Price, Stock Liquidity, Past
Year Return, and Volatility as explanatory variables. It is important to account
for size, since even though larger firms have more press coverage and larger an-
alyst following, which is associated with larger recognition, they also have more
shares available to buy. Illiquid stocks might have fewer shareholders due to the
large transaction costs associated with trading them and not due to recognition.
Therefore, to control for transaction costs we include both 1/Share Price and the
volume-based liquidity measure Stock Liquidity. Both Age and Volatility control
19Bodnaruk and ¨Ostberg (2009) document that the residual shareholder base is negatively related
to returns.
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for total risk of the firm. Firms that have performed well recently might have a
lot of investors, but this does not necessarily represent a permanent firm charac-
teristic. To that end, we include Return on Equity and Past Year Return to control
for the effect of recent performance on the shareholder base.20 Certain investors
might only invest in “value” or “glamour” stocks, and therefore we include BM
into our specifications as a control for firm type.
TABLE 2
Determinants of Shareholder Base
In Table 2, we present the results of a Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression relating the shareholder base to its determinants.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of common shareholders of record (CCM data 100). All variables are described
in the Appendix. We include trading exchange and industry (SIC2) ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry
(SIC2). p-values are in parentheses.
log(Shareholder Base) Estimate p-Value
log(Firm age) 0.40 (0.01)
ROE −0.17 (0.01)
log(Market cap) 0.63 (0.01)
log(BM) 0.23 (0.01)
1/Share price 1.49 (0.01)
Stock liquidity 0.01 (0.72)
Past year return −0.07 (0.01)
Volatility 5.01 (0.01)
Exchange dummies Yes
Industry dummies Yes
Clustering SIC2
Adj. R2 0.431
N 22
The regression results are qualitatively similar to what Grullon et al. (2004)
find. Large, value, and older firms have more shareholders. Additionally, firms
that are cheap to trade (that have a high 1/Share Price) also have more sharehold-
ers. Firms with good recent performance (both in terms of Return on Equity and
Past Year Return) have fewer shareholders. Grullon et al. point out that this find-
ing is consistent with the “disposition effect” whereby investors hold on to past
losers and sell winners.
We define ExShBase as the residual from this regression and employ it as our
measure of recognition throughout the rest of our study. A firm that has a positive
ExShBase (residual) has a larger shareholder base than expected according to its
fundamentals. Using ExShBase instead of Number of Common Shareholders does
not alter the direction of the effects that we measure, but in general it reduces the
economic magnitude of the effects measured.
For the shareholder base to be related to the cost of external financing,
it is important that having a small shareholder base is a persistent characteris-
tic. If this is not the case, then a firm with a small shareholder base can just wait
until its shareholder base returns to normal levels.
To examine whether the shareholder base is persistent, we split firms into
quartiles on the basis of ExShBase. Firms in quartile 4 have the largest shareholder
bases, adjusting for their fundamentals. We identify when a firm enters the largest
20Unlike Grullon et al. (2004), we do not include advertising expenditure in our regressions. First,
it is likely to be highly related to the recognition that the firms have by individual investors. Second,
including a measure of advertising expenditure would result in a tenfold decrease in sample size.
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quartile for the first time, and we record which quartile these firms belong to
over the subsequent 5-year period.21 The results are provided in Table 3. After 5
years, 56.5% of firms originally falling into the quartile with the largest share-
holder bases still belong to this quartile. Another 31.1% have migrated to quartile
3, which implies that 87.6% of firms originally in quartile 4 still have a share-
holder base that is larger than what is expected according to their fundamentals.
The results are similar for firms that have the smallest shareholder bases
(quartile 1). After 5 years, 51.9% of quartile 1 firms still belong to quartile 1.
In total, 82.8% of quartile 1 firms still belong to quartile 1 or 2 after 5 years.
Thus, having a small or large shareholder base seems to be a persistent firm
characteristic.
TABLE 3
Persistence of Excess Shareholder Base
In Table 3, we report the results on the persistence of excess shareholder base for ﬁrms that are selected when they enter
the highest (lowest) quartile of excess shareholder base for the ﬁrst time. Excess shareholder base is the residual of the
regression reported in Table 2. Firms are followed for 5 years to determine which quartile they belong in the subsequent
year. Quartile 4 represents the highest excess shareholder base quartile, and Year 0 is the measurement year. Numbers
shown are percentages. The number of ﬁrms is in square brackets. We require companies to have nonmissing excess
shareholder base for the years –1 to +5 relative to the measurement year.
Quartile
Year 4 3 2 1
Panel A. Persistence of Excess Shareholder Base for Firms That Are in the Highest Quartile of Excess Shareholder Base
in Year 0
0 1.00
[563]
1 0.68 0.29 0.02 0.01
[383] [162] [13] [5]
2 0.61 0.32 0.05 0.02
[346] [179] [27] [11]
3 0.57 0.34 0.06 0.03
[322] [192] [32] [17]
4 0.58 0.32 0.07 0.03
[326] [179] [38] [20]
5 0.57 0.31 0.08 0.04
[318] [175] [45] [25]
Panel B. Persistence of Excess Shareholder Base for Firms That Are in the Lowest Quartile of Excess Shareholder Base
in Year 0
0 1.00
[592]
1 0.02 0.03 0.30 0.65
[12] [17] [179] [384]
2 0.04 0.05 0.34 0.57
[24] [31] [199] [338]
3 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.59
[23] [43] [177] [349]
4 0.06 0.08 0.31 0.55
[34] [45] [186] [327]
5 0.06 0.11 0.31 0.52
[37] [65] [183] [307]
21We restrict our analysis to firms with at least 5 years of uninterrupted values of ExShBase fol-
lowing entering the highest (lowest) quartile of ExShBase. This restriction does not affect our results
in any significant way.
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IV. Results
A. The Shareholder Base and Payout
Firms with negative values of ExShBase have smaller shareholder bases than
implied by their fundamental characteristics. Following Hypothesis 1, we expect
these firms to have high costs of external financing and therefore to pay out less.
In Panel A of Table 4 we provide univariate evidence on the relation between
ExShBase and Total Payout. Companies with negative values of ExShBase pay
out on average 2.21%, while firms with positive values pay out on average 2.59%
(or 17.19% more) of their total assets. Additionally, when we only consider firms
with positive values of Total Payout, small shareholder base firms pay out on
average 3.50% and large shareholder base firms pay out 3.89% (or 11.14% more)
of their total assets. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 4 we restrict the Total Payout to be between 0%–100%
of net income. This selection reduces the average payout significantly. Firms with
positive values of ExShBase pay out 1.55% of total assets, whereas firms with
negative values pay out 1.41% (positive ExShBase firms payout 9.93% more).
The difference is statistically significant.
Panel C of Table 4 reports the results from our multivariate analysis
with Total Payout as the dependent variable. Specifications 1 and 2 are
TABLE 4
Shareholder Base and Total Payout
In Table 4, we investigate the relation between the excess shareholder base and total payout. We utilize the residuals
from the regression reported in Table 2 as our measure of the shareholder base. The dependent variable is next year
total payout, deﬁned as the sum of dividends and repurchases divided by total assets. All variables are described in the
Appendix. Panel A reports the results of univariate analysis both for the full sample and for the sample of companies with
positive total payout. In Panel B we report the results of univariate analysis restricting total payout to be within 0% and 100%
of net income. Panel C reports the results of Tobit regressions. Speciﬁcations 1 and 2 are Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions
with industry ﬁxed effects. For each year we estimate a Tobit regression with Total Payout as a dependent variable. We
report average regression coefﬁcients. The reported p-values (in parentheses) are based on Newey-West (1987) (2 lags)
corrected standard errors of the estimated average regression coefﬁcients. Speciﬁcations 3–7 are panel regressions with
industry (SIC2) and time ﬁxed effects with standard errors clustered at industry level. All estimates are multiplied by 100.
Panel A. Univariate Analysis: All Payouts
Total Payout Total Payout (> 0)
Excess Shareholder Base N Mean Median N Mean Median
High (positive) 26,506 2.59% 0.91% 17,688 3.89% 2.20%
Low (negative) 26,173 2.21% 0.64% 16,506 3.50% 1.91%
t-Stat/ Wilcoxon/ t-Stat/ Wilcoxon/
p-Value p-Value p-Value p-Value
10.16 12.09 7.23 8.69
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Panel B. Univariate Analysis: Payout between 0% and 100% of Net Income
Total Payout Total Payout (> 0)
Excess Shareholder Base N Mean Median N Mean Median
High (positive) 20,580 1.55% 0.38% 11,763 2.70% 1.86%
Low (negative) 21,578 1.41% 0.25% 11,914 2.56% 1.69%
t-Stat/ Wilcoxon/ t-Stat/ Wilcoxon/
p-Value p-Value p-Value p-Value
5.27 5.97 3.75 5.35
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 4 (continued)
Shareholder Base and Total Payout
Panel C. Multivariate Regressions
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Panel
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Total Payout Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
ExShBase 0.29 (0.01) 0.43 (0.01) 0.43 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01) 0.20 (0.05)
ExShBase2 −0.13 (0.01)
× Need external ﬁnancing 0.18 (0.01) 0.28 (0.01)
× No need external ﬁnancing 0.34 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01)
log(Market cap) 0.15 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.50 (0.01) 0.49 (0.01) 0.04 (0.70) 0.42 (0.01)
log(BM) −1.14 (0.01) −1.14 (0.01) −0.75 (0.01) −0.75 (0.01) −0.75 (0.01) −1.47 (0.01) −2.24 (0.01)
DE −0.32 (0.01) −0.32 (0.01) −0.36 (0.01) −0.36 (0.01) −0.36 (0.01) −0.28 (0.01) −0.42 (0.01)
PE −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01)
Operating income 7.75 (0.01) 7.76 (0.01) 13.73 (0.01) 13.71 (0.01) 13.82 (0.01) 11.36 (0.01) 24.33 (0.01)
R&D 0.89 (0.01) 0.89 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.85 (0.01) 4.86 (0.01)
Cash 1.38 (0.01) 1.37 (0.01) 2.11 (0.01) 2.13 (0.01) 2.11 (0.01) 2.43 (0.01) 4.03 (0.01)
Past year return −0.95 (0.01) −0.95 (0.01) −1.28 (0.01) −1.29 (0.01) −1.28 (0.01) −1.36 (0.01) −1.91 (0.01)
Volatility −16.73 (0.01) 16.80 (0.01) −57.09 (0.01) −56.32 (0.01) −57.16 (0.01) −45.21 (0.01) −94.36 (0.01)
Capex −4.76 (0.01) −4.76 (0.01) −8.38 (0.01) −8.43 (0.01) −8.37 (0.01) −10.05 (0.01) −19.03 (0.01)
Institutional ownership 0.20 (0.41) 0.19 (0.44) 0.37 (0.37) 0.28 (0.62) 0.36 (0.38) 0.63 (0.08) −1.32 (0.01)
Industry concentration −1.94 (0.31) −1.52 (0.42) −0.08 (0.95) −0.02 (0.99) −0.01 (0.94) −0.10 (0.50) −0.98 (0.68)
Stock liquidity −0.40 (0.01) −0.40 (0.01) −0.64 (0.01) −0.62 (0.01) −0.64 (0.01) −0.55 (0.01) −0.41 (0.01)
Misvaluation (RRV) −1.28 (0.01) −0.35 (0.30)
Whited-Wu index −12.53 (0.01) −11.36 (0.01)
Managerial ownership −8.39 (0.01)
OBC 0.37 (0.47)
Board independence 0.37 (0.46)
Board size 0.77 (0.06)
G-index 0.00 (0.99)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2
Adj. R2 0.189 0.191 0.189 0.238 0.229
N 21 21 52,679 52,679 52,679 38,492 5,876
term
s of use, available at https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109013000252
D
ow
nloaded from
 https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. U
niversity of B
asel Library, on 30 M
ay 2017 at 13:49:33, subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore
742 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with industry fixed effects. For each year we
estimate a Tobit regression with Total Payout as a dependent variable. We report
average regression coefficients. The reported p-values (in parentheses) are based
on Newey-West (1987) (2 lags) corrected standard errors of the estimated average
regressions coefficients.
The rest of the specifications are pooled panel Tobit regressions with time
and industry fixed effects with standard errors that are clustered at industry (SIC2)
level. Neyman and Scott (1948) document that maximum likelihood estimation
with fixed effects results in an “incidental parameter problem.” In a recent contri-
bution Greene (2004a) documents that in Tobit regressions the incidental param-
eter problem is small when T is 5. Given that in our case T is equal to 21, and that
univariate and Fama-MacBeth (1973) results corroborate our Tobit results, we are
comfortable that our results are not driven by econometric errors.22
Specification 3 includes ExShBase2 in order to capture nonlinearities in the
relation between the shareholder base and payout. In all of our specifications
ExShBase is significantly positively related to Total Payout.
In terms of relative economic impact, considering specification 3 the impact
of ExShBase is roughly 53% the impact of Market Capitalization and 82% the
impact of BM. Specification 6 illustrates that the impact of the shareholder base
on payout is greater than that of governance variables like Board Size, Board
Independence, and G-index.
In specification 4, going from the 25th to the 50th percentile of ExShBase
increases Total Payout by 0.39%. However, going from the 50th to the 75th per-
centile of ExShBase only increases Total Payout by 0.24%. This indicates that
the relation between the shareholder base and payout is stronger the smaller the
shareholder base is and is consistent with the hypothesis that financial constraints
are more binding for firms with smaller shareholder bases.
Arguably, the relation between the shareholder base and payout should be
attenuated for firms that have a need for external financing. Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988) demonstrate that firms in need of external financing will not pay
out any dividend regardless of their degree of financial constraints. Intuitively, a
firm that has a need for financing will invest its earnings rather than retain the
earnings or distribute them to shareholders irrespective of the size of the share-
holder base.
To test this, we estimate the need for external financing as done by Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Durnev and Kim (2005). We define the external
financing need as the difference between the firm’s actual growth rate and the
sustainable growth rate. We estimate the actual growth rate as the prior 2-year ge-
ometric average of annual growth rate in total assets. We estimate the sustainable
growth rate as the 2-year average of ROEt/(1 − ROEt), where ROEt is the firm
return on equity in year t.
We define a dummy variable, Need External Financing, that takes the value
of 1 if the growth of total assets is greater than the sustainable growth rate (ROEt/
22Greene (2004b) documents that the incidental parameter problem is larger for probit regressions
(which we use in Section IV.E). However, he benchmarks the fixed effect, pooled, and random ef-
fect estimators in a probit setting and concludes (p. 111), “It seems likely based on this and all the
preceding results that for T larger than 8, the results will probably favour the fixed-effects estimator.”
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(1 − ROEt)) and 0 otherwise.23 In our sample 32.67% of firms are in need of
external financing. Specifications 2 and 5 interact our variable ExShBase with the
dummy variable Need External Financing and its complement. In both specifica-
tions we find that the effect of the shareholder base is significantly larger for firms
that do not need external financing.
Turning to the control variables, as expected, variables that capture the
amount of funds available to the firm, such as Cash and Operating Income, are
positively related to the payout level. Additionally, variables that capture outflows
from the firm, such as the DE ratio and Capex, are negatively related to payout, il-
lustrating that there is a trade-off in the use of funds. Companies with higher return
volatility and overvalued companies seem to have lower payout levels. Addition-
ally, firms that are more financially constrained according to the Whited-Wu index
pay out less. The inclusion of the Whited-Wu index, Institutional Ownership, and
Industry Concentration does not affect our results in any significant way. Also,
the inclusion of corporate governance variables G-index, Board Size, and Board
Independence does not affect our conclusion that the shareholder base is posi-
tively related to Total Payout. Overall, these results support the hypothesis that
the shareholder base is positively and statistically significantly related to payout.
B. The Shareholder Base and Cash Holdings
Panel A of Table 5 presents univariate results of the relation between ExSh-
Base and Cash. Companies with small shareholder bases (negative ExShBase)
TABLE 5
Shareholder Base and Cash Holdings
In Table 5, we investigate the relation between the excess shareholder base and cash holdings. We utilize the residuals
from the regression reported in Table 2 as our measure of the shareholder base. The dependent variable is cash holdings
at the end of the next ﬁscal year divided by total assets net of cash. All variables are described in the Appendix. In
Panel A we report the results of univariate analysis. Panel B reports multivariate regression results. Speciﬁcations 1 and
2 are Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with industry ﬁxed effects. For each year we estimate an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression with Cash as a dependent variable. We report average regression coefﬁcients. The reported p-values
(in parentheses) are based on Newey-West (1987) (2 lags) corrected standard errors of the estimated average regression
coefﬁcients. Speciﬁcations 3–7 are panel regressions with industry (SIC2) and time ﬁxed effects with standard errors
clustered at industry level. All estimates are multiplied by 100.
Panel A. Univariate Analysis
Cash Holdings
ExShBase N Mean Median
High (positive) 28,058 12.76% 5.39%
Low (negative) 27,891 16.48% 7.02%
t-Stat/p-Value Wilcoxon/p-Value
14.04 13.92
(0.01) (0.01)
(continued on next page)
23We choose ROEt/(1 − ROEt) rather than ROLTCt/(1 − ROLTCt) (where ROLTC is the return
on long-term capital) or (ROAt × bt)/(1− ROAt × bt) (where ROA is the return on assets and b is the
fraction of earnings retained for investment) since we are interested in the relation between the need
for financing and payout to equity holders. See Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) for a lengthier
description of the alternative measures of the need for financing.
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TABLE 5 (continued)
Shareholder Base and Cash Holdings
Panel B. Multivariate Regressions
Fama-MacBeth Pooled Panel
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cash Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
ExShBase −0.65 (0.01) −0.54 (0.01) −0.53 (−4.39) −0.47 (0.01) −0.63 (0.01)
ExShBase2 0.11 (1.79)
× Need external ﬁnancing −0.35 (0.01) −0.39 (0.01)
× No need external ﬁnancing −0.76 (0.01) −0.61 (0.01)
log(Market cap) −1.01 (0.01) −1.01 (0.01) −0.94 (0.01) −0.95 (0.01) −0.94 (0.01) −0.56 (0.01) −0.73 (0.09)
log(BM) −3.99 (0.01) −4.00 (0.01) −4.00 (0.01) −4.00 (0.01) −4.01 (0.01) −5.66 (0.01) −2.88 (0.01)
DE −2.13 (0.01) −2.12 (0.01) −2.11 (0.01) −2.12 (0.01) −2.11 (0.01) −2.38 (0.01) −1.92 (0.01)
PE 0.00 (0.41) 0.00 (0.45) −0.00 (0.40) −0.00 (0.42) −0.00 (0.40) −0.00 (0.45) −0.00 (0.39)
Operating income 1.00 (0.73) 0.96 (0.75) −2.17 (0.08) −2.14 (0.08) −2.19 (0.08) −3.01 (0.10) 10.24 (0.15)
R&D 14.81 (0.01) 14.82 (0.01) 6.97 (0.01) 6.97 (0.01) 6.96 (0.01) 8.73 (0.01) 25.83 (0.02)
Total payout 21.99 (0.01) 21.95 (0.01) 21.51 (0.01) 21.65 (0.01) 21.57 (0.01) 25.06 (0.01) 30.78 (0.01)
Past year return −0.03 (−0.08) −0.03 (−0.08) −0.18 (0.30) −0.17 (0.34) −0.18 (0.30) −0.23 (0.35) 0.80 (0.33)
Volatility −43.41 (0.01) −44.18 (0.01) −14.20 (0.21) −14.59 (0.22) −14.04 (0.21) −10.96 (0.45) 39.25 (0.62)
Capex −22.04 (0.01) −22.04 (0.01) −20.13 (0.01) −20.12 (0.01) −20.12 (0.01) −20.30 (0.01) −28.17 (0.01)
Institutional ownership −2.36 (0.01) −2.32 (0.01) −2.58 (0.01) −2.51 (0.01) −2.58 (0.01) −3.12 (0.01) −7.39 (−0.01)
Industry concentration 29.23 (0.18) 44.86 (0.11) 3.18 (0.36) 3.27 (0.31) 3.49 (0.36) 4.59 (0.09) 11.23 (0.34)
Stock liquidity 2.71 (0.01) 2.72 (0.01) 2.49 (0.01) 2.47 (0.01) 2.48 (0.01) 2.52 (0.01) 2.92 (0.01)
Misvaluation (RRV) −6.36 (0.01) −2.69 (0.09)
Whited-Wu index 7.68 (0.07) 11.18 (0.08)
Managerial ownership 12.34 (0.31)
OBC 1.45 (1.30)
Board independence −0.75 (0.43)
Board size −2.98 (−0.03)
G-index −0.44 (0.01)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2
Adj. R2 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.230 0.372
N 21 21 52,679 52,679 52,679 38,492 5,876
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on average have a ratio of cash to total assets of 16.48%, while firms with large
shareholder bases (positive ExShBase) maintain average cash holdings of 12.76%
of total assets (or 29.95% less). The difference is statistically significant at the
1% level. The effect is similar in economic magnitude and statistically significant
when we consider median cash holdings.
Panel B of Table 5 displays our regression analysis. Specifications 1 and 2
are cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression, while the other specifica-
tions are pooled panel regressions. The coefficient of ExShBase is negative and
statistically significant in all specifications, indicating that the shareholder base
is negatively related to cash holdings. Inspecting specification 4 that includes a
squared term, ExShBase2, we see that going from the 25th to the 75th percentile
in terms of ExShBase decreases Cash by 0.75%, which represents 5.26% of the
unconditional mean. However, going from the 25th to the 50th percentile of ExSh-
Base decreases Cash by 0.45%, and going from the 50th to the 75th percentile of
ExShBase only decreases Cash by 0.30%. Therefore, just as with Total Payout, the
relation between the ExShBase and Cash is nonlinear. The relation is stronger for
firms with small shareholder bases. The economic magnitude of the shareholder
base is similar across all of our specifications.
The relative impact of the shareholder base on Cash is economically sig-
nificant. Considering specification 3, the impact of ExShBase is roughly 35%
the impact of Market Capitalization and 19% the impact of BM. Specification 6
illustrates that the impact of the shareholder base on Cash is 84% of G-index, but
2.7 times larger than the impact of Board Size.
Like in the payout case, we investigate whether the need for external financing
attenuates the impact of the shareholder base. Specifications 2 and 5 document
that the slope coefficient is significantly lower for those firms that have a need for
external financing, indicating that for firms that have no surplus earnings to retain,
the effect of the shareholder base on cash is weakened.
Concerning the control variables, we find that larger firms have lower Cash
ratios. Since large firms consist of more projects that have less than perfectly cor-
related cash needs, it makes sense that larger firms maintain smaller cash-to-asset
levels. Likewise, value firms (high BM ratio) have lower cash holdings. The lower
cash holdings of large firms and firms with high BM ratios has also been docu-
mented by Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003).
Additionally, firms with high levels of Capex have lower Cash ratios. Variables
that are related to the amount of cash that is disgorged to investors, such as Insti-
tutional Ownership and DE level, are also associated with lower cash holdings.
Finally, firms that are more financially constrained according to the Whited-Wu
index have larger cash holdings.
C. Decimalization, the Shareholder Base, and Payout
So far, we document that there is a relation between the shareholder base,
payout, and cash. However, this does not establish that having a large shareholder
base leads to higher payout levels and lower cash retention. It could equally well
be that the firm’s payout and cash policies attract a larger shareholder base.
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To establish a causal link, we need an exogenous shock that affects the share-
holder base but does not alter the firm’s operations and thereby has no direct effect
on payout policy or cash holdings. The introduction of decimal quotes on the
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX in the middle of 2000 to the end of April 2001 sig-
nificantly lowered the transaction costs associated with trading stocks and thereby
increased investor demand and therefore also the size of the shareholder base.24
This effectively alters the demand for the firm’s stock without directly affecting
the firm’s investment opportunity set. Despite the market collapsing in early to
mid 2001, the average firm’s shareholder base increased by 2.56% between the
end of 1999 and the end of 2001. Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) use decimalization
to establish a causal link between liquidity and firm performance.25 In an earlier
contribution, Amihud et al. (1999) consider a very similar experiment. They ex-
amine the effect of a reduction in the minimum trading lot in Japan and find that
this institutional change is associated with an increase in the shareholder base,
liquidity, and stock price.
Like Fang et al. (2009), we consider the change in our dependent variables
(Total Payout and Cash) 1 year prior to the event to 1 year after the event. We
choose this event window since each market shifted some stocks to decimal trad-
ing at earlier dates.26 Our main independent variable is the change in the share-
holder base. As a control variable we include ΔEffective Relative Spread to
capture the impact of changes in liquidity on payout and cash holdings.27 Addi-
tionally, in case decimalization affected the relative incentives of retail investors
and institutional investors to hold shares, we have included the change in Institu-
tional Ownership (measured as the change in the fraction of outstanding equity
held by institutional investors) as a control variable. The correlations between
Δlog#Shareholders, ΔInstitutional Ownership, and ΔEffective Relative Spread
are all below 10% in absolute terms.
Panel A of Table 6 presents our results when we consider the change in
Total Payout as the dependent variable. The main independent variable in speci-
fication 1, the change in the log of the number of shareholders, is positively and
statistically significantly (at the 1% level) related to ΔTotal Payout. In terms of
economic significance, a 1-standard-deviation larger change in the log of number
of shareholders leads to a 0.25% larger increase in ΔTotal Payout. This should
be compared to mean change in Total Payout of −0.89% over our observation
24On Jan. 29, 2001, NYSE and AMEX switched to decimal quotes while NASDAQ switched on
Apr. 9.
25Both Bessembinder (2003) and Furfine (2003) have documented that decimalization had a sig-
nificant impact on transaction costs. They also find that the gain is restricted to those stocks that are
actively traded.
26Bessembinder (2003) notes that roughly 150 stocks on NYSE were introduced at various dates
to decimal trading prior to Jan. 29, 2001. Likewise, roughly 200 stocks on NASDAQ were shifted to
decimal trading on 2 dates prior to Apr. 9.
27We use the Effective Relative Spread as opposed to Stock Liquidity, which we use in the rest
of the paper, for two reasons. First, we want to make sure that our results are comparable to those
of Fang et al. (2009). Second, Stock Liquidity requires the data from the previous year, which would
mean having data for the numerator from after the event and data for the denominator from before
the event. Nonetheless, our results are not qualitatively altered depending on our choice of liquidity
definition.We are grateful to Shane Corwin for sharing with us data on Relative Spreads estimated
from TAQ.
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TABLE 6
Decimalization, Shareholder Base, and Payout
In Table 6, we relate changes in the shareholder base to changes in total payout and cash holdings around the introduction of decimal trading quotes on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in 2000/2001 (decimalization).
Following Fang et al. (2009), changes in all variables are calculated as the difference between the value of the variable at the end of 2001 and at the end of 1999. Panel A reports the effect of changes in the
shareholder base on changes in total payout. We consider both the full sample of companies as well as only the companies that had a positive total payout in 1999. Panel B investigates the impact of changes in
the shareholder base around decimalization on changes in cash holdings. Relative effective spread is the trade-weighted average of bid-ask spread adjusted by the midpoint of bid-ask range. Total assets is the
book value of company total assets (Compustat data 6). Residual volatility is 4-factor-adjusted volatility of company stock returns estimated over a 1-year window from daily data and expressed in yearly terms. All
other variables are described in the Appendix. We utilize industry ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at industry level. All estimates are multiplied by 100. p-values are in parentheses.
Panel A. Change in Shareholder Base and Change in Total Payout
Full Sample If Positive Payout in 1999
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Change in Total Payout Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Δlog(#Shareholders) 0.26 (0.00) 0.37 (0.00)
× Price $5–$10 0.38 (0.00) 0.60 (0.06)
× Price> $10 0.21 (0.00) 0.36 (0.02)
ΔExShBase 0.54 (0.00) 0.66 (0.01)
× Price $5–$10 0.73 (0.00) 0.82 (0.01)
× Price> $10 0.48 (0.00) 0.62 (0.03)
ΔInstitut. ownership 0.15 (0.90) 0.13 (0.91) 0.72 (0.64) 0.69 (0.66) −1.18 (0.50) −1.18 (0.50) −1.13 (0.53) −1.13 (0.52)
ΔRelative eff. spread −5.60 (0.29) −4.46 (0.29) −5.28 (0.58) −5.34 (0.58) −13.74 (0.17) −14.01 (0.16) −10.43 (0.26) −10.48 (0.25)
Δlog(Total assets) −0.75 (0.01) −0.74 (0.01) −1.20 (0.00) −1.19 (0.00) −1.68 (0.00) −1.68 (0.00) −2.91 (0.00) −2.92 (0.00)
ΔResidual volatility −7.95 (0.10) −3.63 (0.11) −17.02 (0.38) −17.56 (0.38) −31.37 (0.00) −30.35 (0.00) −24.67 (0.32) −24.77 (0.31)
ΔPast year return −0.52 (0.00) −0.59 (0.00) −0.67 (0.00) −0.68 (0.00) −0.58 (0.01) −0.57 (0.01) −0.75 (0.00) −0.76 (0.00)
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2
N 2,724 2,724 1,913 1,913 1,726 1,726 1,779 1,396
Adj. R2 0.023 0.024 0.030 0.030 0.036 0.037 0.055 0.055
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 6 (continued)
Decimalization, Shareholder Base, and Payout
Panel B. Change in Shareholder Base and Change in Cash Holdings
1 2 3 4
Change in Cash Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Δlog(#Shareholders) −0.89 (0.06)
× Price $5–$10 −1.11 (0.04)
× Price> 10 −0.54 (0.29)
ΔExShBase −1.05 (0.03)
× Price $5–$10 −1.60 (0.05)
× Price> $10 −0.85 (0.04)
ΔInstitut. ownership 10.98 (0.00) 10.88 (0.00) 13.08 (0.01) 13.18 (0.01)
ΔRelative eff. spread 22.00 (0.06) 22.49 (0.06) 27.47 (0.34) 27.48 (0.34)
Δlog(Total assets) 10.77 (0.00) 10.80 (0.00) 11.12 (0.00) 11.10 (0.00)
ΔResidual volatility −49.06 (0.06) −49.63 (0.06) −74.45 (0.37) −72.88 (0.38)
ΔPast year return 1.64 (0.07) 1.64 (0.05) 1.00 (0.29) 1.01 (0.29)
Industry ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2
N 2,724 2,724 1,913 1,913
Adj. R2 0.1284 0.1281 0.1197 0.1194
period. Specification 3 is identical to specification 1 except that we consider the
ΔExShBase as the main independent variable. A 1-standard-deviation increase
in ΔExShBase leads to an increase in ΔTotal Payout of 0.40%, and the effect is
statistically significant at the 1% level.
We consider the same control variables as Fang et al. (2009) with the ex-
ception of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 dummy variable that is insignificant
in all of their specifications. Interestingly, the change in institutional ownership
is never statistically significantly related to the change in Total Payout and the
sign of the coefficient changes depending on whether we consider only firms with
positive payout.
An equal decline in transaction costs across stocks implies a larger relative
impact on stocks with low prices. Therefore it is likely that decimalization was
a larger event for low price stocks. To investigate this conjecture we introduce 2
dummy variables: Low Price (High Price), which takes the value 1 if the price
is between $5 and $10 (above $10), and 0 otherwise. In our sample, 36.72%
of stocks were in the $5–$10 price range at the end of 1999. In specifications
2 and 4 we interact our measure of the shareholder base with dummy variables
for the stock price level to examine whether the strength of the relation differs
across stock price levels. As expected, in both specifications the economic effect
is substantially larger for low price stocks.
To make sure that our results are not in some way influenced by nonpaying
firms, we consider only firms that have positive payout levels in the beginning
of 1999 in specifications 5–8. Specifications 5 and 6 have as main independent
variable the change in the log of the number of shareholders, while specifications
7 and 8 consider ΔExShBase. The significance levels and economic impact are
very similar to specifications 1–4.
In Panel B of Table 6 we consider ΔCash as dependent variable. Like in
Panel A, we consider the change in the log of the number of shareholders in spec-
ifications 1 and 2, while specifications 3 and 4 use ΔExShBase as the main
independent variable. In both specifications our proxy for the change in the share-
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holder base is negatively related to the change in cash holdings (ΔCash), and
the relation is statistically significant at the 1% level. In specification 1,
a 1-standard-deviation increase in the change in the number of shareholders
results in a reduction of cash holdings of 1.61%. The corresponding impact in
specification 3 of ΔExShBase on the change in cash holdings is a reduction of
3.26%. These numbers should be compared to the unconditional mean change in
cash holdings of −2.25%. Specifications 2 and 4 interact our dummy variables
Low Price and High Price with our measures of the shareholder base. Similarly
to when we considered payout, the relation between changes in the shareholder
base and ΔCash is significantly stronger for low price stocks for which decimal-
ization was a larger event. Additionally, we find that firms that experience positive
changes in Institutional Ownership, Total Assets, and Past Year Return also have
positive changes in cash levels. In both panels of Table 6, we include industry
fixed effects and cluster standard errors on the industry level.
The results of these panels indicate that when there is an exogenous drop
in the transaction costs associated with trading in stocks, firms experience an in-
crease in the shareholder base. This relation has been documented by Amihud et
al. (1999), who find that reducing trading costs results in an increase in the share-
holder base, liquidity, and stock price. We build on this by showing that there
is a relation between the increase in the shareholder base and how payout and
cash holdings change. A larger change in the shareholder base results in a larger
positive change in payout and a smaller change in cash holdings. Both of these
results are indicative of the cost of external financing being related to the size of
the shareholder base.
Although no event is a perfect natural experiment, we believe that decimal-
ization has a number of advantages over other events such as the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 and state-level tax changes. By altering
the relative tax treatment of repurchases and dividend, the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 altered the incentives for the 2 payout meth-
ods. Therefore, this event has implications for clientele effects. State-level tax
changes are often endogenous to the performance of firms within the state. So, an
increase in state-level taxes might be motivated by low tax revenues from state
firms, which then coincide with low firm payouts. In this setting, it would be hard
to argue that the lower payout is driven by a reduction in the shareholder base
due to an increase in taxes rather than poor firm performance. The advantage with
decimalization as an event is that it is most likely unrelated to firm performance.
D. Repurchases and the Shareholder Base
In this section we investigate Hypothesis 2: whether a repurchase reduces the
size of the shareholder base. To argue that maintaining the size of the shareholder
base is an important consideration when choosing the method of payout, we need
to verify that undertaking a share repurchase and paying special dividends affects
the shareholder base differently. In particular, for special dividends to have an
advantage over repurchases we should observe that the latter reduces the share-
holder base (and thus increases the cost of external financing), while the former
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does not. Therefore, we examine the effect of repurchases and special dividends
on the size of the shareholder base.
Table 7 presents the results from pooled panel regressions. Our dependent
variable is the change in the logarithm of the number of common shareholders
(ΔShBase) in year t (and t + 1), where t is the year when the special distribution
is made. We present results in terms of changes in the number of common share-
holders to facilitate interpretation, but the results in terms of changes in ExShBase
are qualitatively equivalent.28 Our main variables of interest are Share Repurchase
and Special Dividend. Share Repurchase is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the firm has repurchased at least 1% of its outstanding stock in year t.
Special Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm under-
takes a special dividend in year t. We find that undertaking a repurchase leads to
a decline in the shareholder base over years t and t + 1. Undertaking a repurchase
in year t leads to a reduction in the shareholder base in year t of between 1.26%
and 2.41%. This reduction continues in year t + 1, so over 2 years (t and t + 1)
TABLE 7
The Effect of Share Repurchases and Special Dividends on Shareholder Base
In Table 7, we present the results of the effect of share repurchases and special dividends on the shareholder base in
the year when the special distribution is undertaken and in the subsequent year. The change in shareholder base in year t
is calculated as the difference in the logarithm of the number of common shareholders of record at the end of year t and
year t − 1. The dependent variable is the change in shareholder base at year t (t + 1), where year t is a year when a
special distribution is made. All variables are described in the Appendix. All estimates are multiplied by 100. p-values are
in parentheses.
ΔShareholder Baset ΔShareholder Baset+1
1 2 3 4
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Share repurchaset −1.26 (0.03) −2.40 (0.02) −2.44 (0.01) −2.51 (0.01)
Special dividendt 4.45 (0.02) 14.01 (0.02) −0.19 (0.64) 2.62 (0.01)
ΔShareholder baset −7.74 (0.01) −3.97 (0.01)
ΔShareholder baset−1 −14.52 (0.01) −11.27 (0.01) −3.25 (0.01) −5.07 (0.01)
ΔShareholder baset−2 −4.27 (0.01) −5.41 (0.01)
log(Market cap) 0.17 (0.53) 1.20 (0.15) −0.83 (0.88) 1.15 (0.53)
log(BM) −4.90 (0.01) −5.80 (0.01) −5.37 (0.01) −1.84 (0.01)
DE −0.89 (0.01) −1.29 (0.03) −2.36 (0.42) −1.36 (0.51)
PE 0.01 (0.08) 0.02 (0.19) −2.69 (0.99) 1.11 (0.99)
Operating income 3.07 (0.24) 15.07 (0.16) 1.18 (0.01) 1.35 (0.01)
R&D 3.64 (0.09) 8.50 (0.01) 1.52 (0.01) 2.04 (0.02)
Total payout −33.57 (0.01) −52.95 (0.01) −1.37 (0.01) −1.15 (0.01)
Past year return 1.76 (0.02) 1.60 (0.17) 7.87 (0.01) 3.82 (0.01)
Volatility 44.54 (0.17) 446.65 (0.05) −0.95 (0.01) 0.25 (0.01)
Capex 22.63 (0.02) 38.38 (0.03) 0.74 (0.01) 0.95 (0.01)
Cash 2.95 (0.02) −2.05 (0.52) 1.10 (0.02) −0.30 (0.08)
Institutional ownership −0.57 (0.61) 4.78 (0.61) 1.00 (0.09) 0.87 (0.01)
Industry concentration 15.90 (0.03) 18.17 (0.02) 2.40 (0.09) −0.25 (0.03)
Stock liquidity 1.63 (0.01) 0.75 (0.34) 3.31 (0.61) 0.41 (0.79)
Misvaluation (RRV) 1.56 (0.48) 0.04 (0.88)
Whited-Wu index 4.56 (0.67) 1.38 (0.01)
Managerial ownership 0.88 (0.96) 0.67 (0.01)
OBC 1.04 (0.52) 0.43 (0.22)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2
Adj. R2 0.029 0.037 0.026 0.024
No. of obs. 34,345 9,077 33,465 8,100
28The correlation betweenΔExShBase and changes in log number of shareholders is 86.9%.
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the shareholder base is reduced by between 3.70% and 4.91%.29 At the same
time, paying a special dividend leads to an increase in the shareholder base. This
increase in the shareholder base could be due to the attention that is associated
with a special dividend. These results demonstrate that repurchases and special
dividends have substantial and asymmetric effects on the shareholder base. If the
shareholder base is valuable, then there is a clear disadvantage to using a repur-
chase as the distribution method.
One potential concern is that firms may issue equity in the future to counter
the negative impact of the repurchase on the shareholder base. In unreported re-
sults we find that repurchasing firms are less likely to undertake a seasoned equity
offering at any point over the next 3 years. Therefore, if anything, the difference
in shareholder base between repurchasing and nonrepurchasing firms is widened
over the following 3 years.
Open market repurchase programs often continue for several years, so a firm
that repurchases in year t is likely to have repurchased in year t − 1. To control
for this, we include the change in the shareholder base over the previous year
(ΔShBaset−1) and the year before that (ΔShBaset−2) in our specifications. It turns
out that there is a negative and significant relation between current changes and
previous changes, implying that there is a certain amount of mean reversion in
the shareholder base. However, the amount of mean reversion present is limited,
since Table 3 illustrates that having a small or large shareholder base is a fairly
persistent characteristic.
E. The Shareholder Base and the Choice of Payout Method
In this section we investigate Hypothesis 3: whether the size of the share-
holder base matters for the choice of payout method. If maintaining a broad
shareholder base is valuable to the firm, then the choice of distribution method is
important. A repurchase reduces the size of the shareholder base and is there-
fore costly. As a result, firms with particularly small shareholder bases should be
more reluctant to reduce the size of the shareholder base through a repurchase.
On the other hand, a special dividend does not reduce the size of the shareholder
base. Therefore, we expect that firms that have particularly small shareholder
bases should be more likely to undertake special dividends, while firms with large
shareholder bases should favor repurchases that are more tax efficient.
In Panel A of Table 8, we examine the univariate relation between the share-
holder base and the decision to undertake a repurchase and pay special dividends.
We split firms into 2 groups depending on whether they have an ExShBase that is
below or above 0.30
We find that firms with large shareholder bases are 7.5% more likely to
undertake a repurchase than small shareholder base firms. The difference is
significant at the 1% level. Additionally, large shareholder base firms repurchase
20.5% more than small shareholder base firms.
29In unreported results, we find that there is no relation between special distributions and the change
in the shareholder base in year t + 2.
30These results are qualitatively unaltered if we use the median level of the ExShBase as breakpoint.
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The probability that a firm with a large (small) ExShBase undertakes a special
dividend is 1.40% (2.02%). The 0.62% difference between firms with positive
and negative ExShBase is statistically significant. So, firms with large shareholder
bases are more likely to undertake a repurchase and less likely to undertake a spe-
cial dividend than firms with small shareholder bases.
The decision to undertake a repurchase or a special dividend can be seen as
two sequential decisions. First, the firm decides whether to make a special dis-
tribution to shareholders. Second, the firm chooses the method of distribution.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that given a special distribution, firms with a small share-
holder base should be more likely to undertake a special dividend. In Panels B
and C of Table 8 we relate the shareholder base to the method of payout while
TABLE 8
Shareholder Base and the Choice of Payout Method
In Table 8, we relate the excess shareholder base to the likelihood of paying a special dividend and undertaking a re-
purchase. Panel A presents univariate results on the relation between the excess shareholder base and the decision to
pay a special dividend and repurchase stock (likelihood and size) in the subsequent year. Panel B presents results of a
probit analysis of the relation between the excess shareholder base and the likelihood of undertaking a special distribu-
tion (share repurchase or special dividend). The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
company makes a special distribution (special dividend or repurchase) in the following year, and 0 otherwise. Panel C
presents the results of a probit analysis relating the excess shareholder base to the method of a special distribution. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the special distribution is a repurchase, 0 if it is a
special dividend. We control for selectivity utilizing Heckman’s lambda from the selection regression reported in Panel B.
All regressions control for time and industry ﬁxed effects with standard errors clustered at industry level. Residuals from
the regression reported in Table 2 are used as our measure of the shareholder base. All variables are described in the
Appendix. Marginal effects (ME) for all variables are multiplied by 100. p-values are in parentheses.
Panel A. Univariate Analysis
Likelihood of Likelihood of Size of
Special Dividend Repurchase Repurchase
Excess Shareholder Base N Mean t-Stat. Prob. Mean t-Stat. Prob. Mean t-Stat. Prob.
High (positive) 28,065 1.40% 5.61 0.01 23.48% 4.63 0.01 1.41% 6.75 0.01
Low (negative) 27,939 2.02% 21.84% 1.17%
Panel B. Shareholder Base and the Decision to Undertake a Special Distribution
1 2
Special Distribution Dummy Estimate p-Value ME Estimate p-Value ME
ExShBase 0.03 (0.01) 0.84 0.03 (0.01) 0.76
log(Market cap) 0.09 (0.01) 2.70 0.07 (0.01) 2.02
log(BM) 0.17 (0.01) 4.93 0.04 (0.04) 0.99
DE −0.02 (0.32) −0.51 −0.01 (0.40) −0.40
PE −0.00 (0.06) −0.01 −0.00 (0.11) −0.01
Operating income 2.64 (0.01) 76.02 2.70 (0.01) 76.30
R&D 0.13 (0.19) 3.82 0.17 (0.01) 4.76
Dividend-to-earnings −0.16 (0.10) −4.62 −0.15 (0.01) −4.35
Repurchase-to-earnings 0.15 (0.01) 4.36 0.15 (0.01) 4.22
Past year return −0.13 (0.01) −3.61 −0.15 (0.01) −4.25
Volatility −14.72 (0.01) −424.36 −21.28 (0.01) −601.71
Capex −1.83 (0.01) −52.86 −1.98 (0.01) −56.11
Institutional ownership 0.29 (0.01) 8.26 0.24 (0.01) 6.68
Industry concentration 0.13 (0.25) 3.80 0.17 (0.29) 4.77
Stock liquidity −0.05 (0.01) −1.45 −0.04 (0.01) −1.26
Misvaluation (RRV) −0.39 (0.04) −10.99
Whited-Wu index −0.49 (0.01) −13.94
log(Firm age) 0.07 (0.01) 2.11 0.08 (0.01) 2.38
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2
Adj. R2 0.101 0.112
N 52,526 38,450
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 8 (continued)
Shareholder Base and the Choice of Payout Method
Panel C. Shareholder Base and the Choice of Special Distribution (Share Repurchase vs. Special Dividend)
1 2 3
Share Repurchase Dummy Estimate p-Value ME Estimate p-Value ME Estimate p-Value ME
ExShBase 0.12 (0.02) 0.59 0.09 (0.09) 0.39 0.13 (0.10) 0.07
log(Market cap) 0.13 (0.10) 0.66 0.03 (0.82) 0.11 0.19 (0.06) 0.10
log(BM) 0.09 (0.55) 0.44 −0.14 (0.44) −0.56 0.00 (1.00) 0.00
DE 0.05 (0.31) 0.27 0.09 (0.24) 0.33 0.28 (0.18) 0.15
PE 0.00 (0.37) −0.01 0.00 (0.26) 0.00 0.00 (0.03) 0.00
Operating income 0.66 (0.77) 3.26 −2.85 (0.16) −11.32 0.21 (0.91) 0.12
R&D 5.68 (0.01) 28.17 7.43 (0.01) 29.75 2.38 (0.28) 1.33
Dividend-to-earnings −0.43 (0.01) −2.12 −0.27 (0.03) −1.07 −0.22 (0.01) −0.93
Repurchase-to-earnings 0.32 (0.01) 1.59 0.20 (0.10) 0.79 0.12 (0.17) 0.47
Past year return −0.53 (0.01) −2.61 −0.37 (0.01) −1.49 −0.31 (0.17) −0.17
Volatility 7.72 (0.39) 38.30 30.22 (0.06) 119.82 18.75 (0.75) 10.46
Capex −0.60 (0.75) −3.00 1.53 (0.34) 6.07 −0.20 (0.91) −0.11
Institutional ownership 0.95 (0.01) 4.72 0.55 (0.03) 2.17 1.11 (0.07) 0.62
Industry concentration 0.50 (0.40) 2.48 0.62 (0.20) 2.46 3.06 (0.13) 1.71
Stock liquidity 0.03 (0.49) 0.16 0.08 (0.16) 0.31 0.26 (0.27) 0.14
Misvaluation (RRV) 0.02 (0.83) 0.09 −0.78 (0.13) −0.44
Whited-Wu index 0.02 (0.98) 0.06 0.67 (0.36) 0.37
Managerial ownership −0.38 (0.85) −0.21
OBC 1.29 (0.00) 0.72
G-index 0.07 (0.01) 0.04
Lambda 0.71 (0.70) 3.51 −0.90 (0.38) −3.55 −0.52 (0.48) −2.62
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2
Adj. R2 0.195 0.235 0.296
N 12,336 8,947 3,330
conditioning on the decision to make a special distribution to shareholders. To do
this, we employ a 2-stage probit procedure, where the dependent variable in the
1st stage is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm undertakes a
special distribution (repurchase or special dividend), and 0 otherwise. In the 2nd
stage, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
firm undertakes a repurchase and 0 if the firm undertakes a special dividend.
Examining the 1st-stage regressions in Panel B of Table 8, we find firms with
larger shareholder bases are more likely to make special distributions, which is
consistent with our earlier findings for total payout. In particular, going from 25th
to 75th percentile of ExShBase increases the likelihood of a special distribution
by 1.32%, or 6.09% relative to the unconditional mean. Additionally, we find
that larger firms, value firms, firms with greater operating income, and firms with
larger amounts of payout in the previous period are more likely to undertake a
special distribution. Firms with larger institutional ownership and low dividend
payout are also more likely to undertake a one-time distribution.
In the 2nd stage we consider the method of payout while conditioning on
the decision to undertake a special distribution. We find that firms with smaller
shareholder bases favor paying special dividends over undertaking repurchases.
In particular, a decrease in excess shareholder base from 75th to 25th percentile
increases the likelihood that a special distribution is a special dividend by 1.08%
(or 13.97% relative to the unconditional mean). The 2nd-stage regression also
indicates that when controlling for the decision to make a special distribution,
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firms with high levels of dividend payout and good past performance are less
likely to use a repurchase as a payout method. The results of this section indicate
that firms with limited shareholder bases are reluctant to use repurchase as a
method of payout.
V. Robustness
There is an extensive literature on the relation between the composition of
the shareholder base and payout policy. For example, institutions may prefer to
hold stocks with a particular payout policy for tax reasons. This would imply
causality from the payout policy to the ownership structure. However, the causal-
ity could also be the reverse: Institutions prefer a particular payout policy, and
they encourage the firm to follow this policy. Two recent contributions to this
literature are Graham and Kumar (2006) and Grinstein and Michaely (2005),
which consider clientele effects due to retail investors and institutional owner-
ship, respectively. This literature raises two relevant issues for our paper. First, is
it possible that serial correlation in payout in conjunction with reverse causality
could explain our results? The story would be that payout policy determines the
size of the shareholder base, and current levels of payout are determined by past
levels of payout. To explore this issue, in this section we examine the relation be-
tween our variables of interest in a series of vector autoregressions. Second, is our
variable of interest, ExShBase, related to the ownership composition of the firm?
To address this, we conduct multivariate sorts to verify that the relation between
ExShBase and Total Payout and Cash holds for stocks with different investor com-
position and other characteristics that different clienteles might show preference
over.
To examine whether past levels of payout determine both current levels of
payout and the size of the shareholder base, we estimate the following set of
vector autoregressions (e.g., Grinstein and Michaely (2005)):
Payouti,t+1 = c0 + c1Payouti,t + d1ExShBasei,t + φWt + εi,t+1,
Cashi,t+1 = a0 + a1Cashi,t + b1ExShBasei,t + βWt + νi,t+1,
ExShBasei,t+1 = k0 + k1ExShBasei,t + l1,Cashi,t + z1Payout + γWt + ηi,t+1,
where Payout, Cash, and ExShBase are defined as before;Wt is a vector of con-
trol variables; and the corresponding coefficients are given by φ, β, and γ for the
respective equation.31 As always, we include industry and time dummy variables
and cluster standard errors at the industry level.
The estimation results in Table 9 indicate that the ExShBase Granger causes
Payout and Cash. However, it does not appear as if past levels of Cash and
Payout Granger cause ExShBase. These results and the effect of decimalization
(see Section IV.C) are supportive of the thesis that the shareholder base affects
payout and cash holdings of firms.
31We use the Akaike information criterion to determine the optimal number of lags. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that the optimal number of lags is 1.
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TABLE 9
VAR
In Table 9, we report the results of panel vector autoregressive (VAR) regressions (with 1 lag). The dependent variables are
measured at the end of next year. All other variables are measured at the end of current year. All variables are described
in the Appendix. All estimates are multiplied by 100. p-values are in parentheses.
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Total payout 69.70 (0.01) 57.19 (0.01) 1.31 (0.30) 2.67 (0.66) –1.46 (0.86)
Cash 0.52 (0.01) 73.72 (0.01) 72.29 (0.01) 1.94 (0.13) 0.19 (0.88)
ExShBase 0.12 (0.01) 0.15 (0.01) –0.08 (0.02) –0.08 (0.06) 90.97 (0.01) 91.10 (0.01)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2
Adj. R2 0.274 0.367 0.600 0.622 0.805 0.811
N 61,043 48,202 61,043 48,202 61,043 48,202
To illustrate that the relation between the shareholder base and payout is
not driven by investor composition, we conduct multivariate sorts in Table 10. In
Panel A of Table 10, we first sort companies into 5 size quintiles followed by
2 groups, by either Institutional Ownership (IO) or BM or Whited-Wu or Mis-
valuation. Following this, all stocks are split into 2 groups according to their
ExShBase. This implies that we have 20 groups of stocks (5 × 2 × 2). We re-
port the difference in Total Payout between large shareholder base firms (greater
than median ExShBase) and small shareholder base firms. From Hypothesis 1, we
expect this difference to be positive. Examining the results for the 3-way sort on
size, Institutional Ownership, and ExShBase, we find that in the majority of cases,
large shareholder base firms have larger levels of Total Payout. It is comforting
to observe that the exceptions to this relation are found among the smallest firms
(size quintiles 1 and 2). The 3-way sorts on size, BM, and ExShBase, indicate that
whether the stock is a value or glamour stock cannot explain the larger payout
levels of large shareholder base firms. Similar conclusions can be drawn when
examining the sorts on Whited-Wu and Misvaluation. The results remain econom-
ically and statistically significant when considering median payout levels, which
indicates that outliers are not driving our results.
In Panel B of Table 10, we follow the same sorting procedure as in Panel A,
but consider differences in Cash holdings between large and small shareholder
base firms. Following Hypothesis 1, we expect the difference to be negative. Ex-
amining the results for Institutional Ownership, we find that in the majority of
cases, large shareholder base firms have lower cash holdings (except for size quin-
tiles 1 and 2, where the difference is not always significant). Overall, when exam-
ining the other variables that we sort on, we find strong support for the hypothesis
that large shareholder base firms have lower cash holdings.
The evidence presented in Table 10 indicates that the differences in Total
Payout and Cash between large and small shareholder base firms cannot be ex-
plained by differences in institutional ownership or other variables that might have
clienteles.
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TABLE 10
The Relation between Shareholder Base and Total Payout and Cash Holdings: Sorting Evidence
In Table 10, we examine the relation between excess shareholder base and total payout and cash holdings for different size, value, institutional ownership, ﬁnancial constraints (Whited-Wu (WW) (2006)), and
misvaluation groups. At the end of previous year, companies are sorted in 20 (5 × 2× 2) groups based on size, book-to-market (BM)/institutional ownership (IO)/WW index/misvaluation and excess shareholder
base. In Panel A (Panel B) we report the difference in average and median total payout (cash holdings) between high and low excess shareholder base groups. Differences in total payout and cash holdings are
multiplied by 100, and p-values for 1-sided t-test and Wilcoxon test are reported in parentheses.
BM IO WW Misvaluation
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Size Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A. Total Payout
Small 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.39 0.10 0.19 0.00
(0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.15)
2 0.56 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.84 0.12 0.06 −0.01 0.05 −0.23 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.02 0.58 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.55) (0.49) (0.64) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01)
3 0.70 0.42 0.34 0.26 0.51 0.48 0.34 0.20 0.32 0.09 0.25 0.00 0.41 0.28 0.50 0.34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
4 0.91 0.85 0.47 0.56 0.79 0.82 0.34 0.32 0.70 0.39 0.49 0.26 0.48 0.67 0.63 0.68
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large 0.79 0.80 0.43 0.61 0.20 0.64 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.67 0.63 0.26 0.39 0.28 0.36
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.64) (0.20) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
Panel B. Cash Holdings
Small 0.02 −0.07 −0.58 −0.19 −0.10 0.44 −0.37 −0.29 –0.19 –0.17 –1.22 –1.57 –0.34 –0.47 0.62 0.64
(0.95) (0.30) (0.11) (0.26) (0.83) (0.11) (0.41) (0.19) (0.64) (0.47) (0.03) (0.02) (0.62) (0.23) (0.18) (0.01)
2 −0.56 −0.56 −1.55 −1.06 −0.15 −1.04 −1.37 −1.40 –1.00 –1.15 –0.43 –0.16 –0.55 –1.95 –0.72 –0.22
(0.23) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.44) (0.24) (0.33) (0.01) (0.16) (0.41)
3 −2.10 −2.43 −2.96 −1.57 −2.83 −2.36 −2.48 −2.27 –1.94 –1.30 –1.68 –2.77 –3.85 –4.62 –1.42 –0.96
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
4 −3.29 −2.86 −2.61 −1.51 −4.25 −3.13 −2.28 −1.11 –1.13 –0.11 –2.53 –2.79 –3.63 –3.12 –3.78 –2.34
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Large −3.21 −2.14 −1.09 −0.88 −3.10 −1.48 −2.50 −1.76 –0.17 0.10 –2.54 –2.07 –2.08 –0.93 –4.43 –2.75
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.35) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
term
s of use, available at https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109013000252
D
ow
nloaded from
 https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. U
niversity of B
asel Library, on 30 M
ay 2017 at 13:49:33, subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore
Bodnaruk and Östberg 757
VI. Conclusion
Survey evidence presented by Brav et al. (2005) and the amount of resources
spent by firms on investor relations indicate that the shareholder base is of im-
portance to firms. One reason why a large shareholder base is important is that it
reduces the cost of external financing. First, having a large shareholder base may
reduce asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders through more in-
formation production. Second, the shareholder base may be related to the recog-
nition of the firm and hence the availability of external financing. For example,
Merton ((1987), p. 500) states that “an increase in the relative size of the firm’s
investor base will reduce the firm’s cost of capital and increase the market value
of the firm.” Common to both the asymmetric information and the recognition
story is that the cost of external financing is negatively related to the size of the
shareholder base.
We develop and test three implications of there being a relation between the
shareholder base and the cost of external financing. First, we verify that firms
with small shareholder bases behave as if they are financially constrained: They
pay out less and have higher cash reserves. Second, we document that the method
of payout affects the size of the shareholder base. Undertaking a repurchase re-
duces the size of the shareholder base, while a special dividend is neutral or even
has a slight positive effect. Third, we document that firms that have small share-
holder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the shareholder base
further), thereby effectively avoiding a smaller shareholder base. However, small
shareholder base firms are more likely to use special dividends as a distribution
method. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that the shareholder base not
only affects firm valuation but is also an important consideration for payout policy.
The findings of this paper suggest that further research should examine how
recognition interacts with firm decisions. A recent example of this is Lou (2010),
who finds that firms increase advertising prior to undertaking seasoned equity
offerings. However, additional work is needed to strengthen the link between
recognition, returns, and corporate policies of firms.
Appendix. Variable Definitions
Shareholder base. Number of common shareholders of record (in 000s) CRSP-Compustat
Merged database (CCM) data 100.
Market cap. Year-end equity market capitalization: (price × shares outstanding): CCM
data 24 × data 25.
Book-to-market (BM). Ratio of long-term debt to the total equity of the firm: CCM data
9/data 60.
Price-to-earnings (PE). Ratio of the year-end stock price to earnings per share for the prior
fiscal year: CCM data 24/data 58.
Debt-to-equity (DE). Ratio of long-term debt to the total equity of the firm: CCM data
9/data 60.
Operating income. Ratio of operating income to total assets: CCM data 13/data 6.
R&D. Ratio of research and development to total assets, set 0 when missing: CCM data
46/data 12.
Cash. Ratio of cash holdings to total assets: CCM data 1/data 6.
Dividend payout. Ratio of dollar amount of dividends to total assets: CCM data 21/data 6.
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Total payout. Sum of dollar amount of dividends and dollar volume of repurchases divided
by total assets: CCM (data 21 + data 115)/data 6.
Stock liquidity. Sum of the monthly share volume over the previous year divided by the
number of shares outstanding at the end of the year: CRSP monthly stocks.
Past year return. Compounded monthly return for the previous year: CRSP monthly stocks.
Volatility. Stock return volatility, computed as the standard deviation of daily stock returns
for the previous year: CRSP daily stocks.
Capital expenditure (Capex). Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of the firm: CCM
data 128/data 6.
Firm age. Number of years the firm existed in CRSP daily stocks database.
Share price. Median price of the firm share over the previous 1 year: CRSP daily stocks.
ROE. Ratio of earnings to average equity for the prior fiscal year: CCM data 20/(data 60 +
data 60(t − 1))/2).
Institutional ownership (IO). Year-end fraction of shares outstanding owned by institu-
tional fund managers: Spectrum 13f.
Industry concentration. Sum of the squared market share of each firm in the same industry
during a year. Market share is defined as the total sales of the firm in a given year
divided by the total sales of the industry in the year. The industry is defined at the
3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code level, where the SIC codes have
been obtained from CRSP monthly stocks (variable SICCD). The sales data come
from CCM: data 12.
Misvaluation (RRV). Sector-adjusted firm-specific valuation errors corresponding to the
residuals of Model 3 in RRV (2005), which regresses market value on leverage, book
value of assets, and net income for 12 Fama-French (1997) sectors of the economy.
Estimated from CCM.
Whited-Wu index. Index of financial constraint of Whited-Wu (2006): WW = − 0.091 ×
CF− 0.062×DIVPOS + 0.021×TLTD− 0.044×LNTA + 0.102×ISG− 0.035×SG,
where CF is a ratio of cash flows to total assets, DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the
value of 1 if the firm pays cash dividends, TLTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to
total assets, LNTA is the natural log of total assets, ISG is the firm’s 3-digit industry
sales growth, and SG is firm sales growth. Estimated from CCM.
Managerial ownership. Fraction of shares outstanding pertaining to the top 5 company
executives. Estimated from Thomson Reuters Insider Database.
Option-based compensation (OBC). The proportion of total compensation to the manage-
ment officers of the firm paid in the form of stock options. Estimated from Thomson
Reuter Insiders database.
Board independence. Ratio of independent directors to total directors. Estimated from
IRRC.
Board size. Number of directors divided by the logarithm of total assets. Estimated from
IRRC.
Corporate governance index (G). Measured as in Gompers et al. (2003): Sum of the num-
ber of provisions restricting shareholder rights. Data obtained from IRRC.
Special dividend dummy. A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a company paid
special dividends in a given year, and 0 otherwise. A dividend is classified as spe-
cial if it has a distribution code of 1262 or 1272. Estimated from CRSP monthly
data.
Need external financing. A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm’s actual growth
rate exceeds its sustainable growth rate. Following Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) and Durnev and Kim (2005), actual growth is measured as the 2-year geomet-
ric average of the annual growth rate in total assets and sustainable growth rate as a
2-year average of ROE/(1 – ROE).
Share repurchase dummy. A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a company re-
purchased shares in a given year, and 0 otherwise. A company is defined to have
a repurchase if the purchase of common and preferred stock less the decrease in
par value of preferred stock (CCM data 115 + data 130) is greater than 1% of total
assets.
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